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9. Watching Hainan, Remembering Murmansk 
Cold War Analogies, Maritime Access, and the Future of Warfare 
Adam Grissom 
 
Naval Race in the Western Pacific 
Naval races have long been a harbinger of great-power competition. Just as Lysander built Sparta’s 
first battle fleet to challenge Athenian naval mastery in the Aegean, and Tirpitz built Germany’s 
Riskflotte to challenge British naval mastery in the North Sea, so today China is challenging American 
naval mastery in the Western Pacific. We are in the early stages of a classic naval race pitting a rising 
continental power against an established maritime power for control of the approaches to the 
Eurasian landmass.1 
The first definitive move of the race occurred last year when China deployed a maritime 
reconnaissance-strike complex comprised of over-the-horizon surveillance radars, ocean 
reconnaissance satellites, and an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) version of the DF-21D Anti-
Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM). Though a robust debate is occurring in the community of American 
experts over the maturity and implications of the DF-21D, its unveiling has precipitated a full-scale 
naval scare in the United States, reaching beyond the experts to the broader policy elite and popular 
culture.2 The Department of Defense (DoD) has, meanwhile, accepted China’s challenge by 
expanding certain naval acquisition programs, shifting additional assets to the US Pacific Fleet, and 
developing a new concept of operations it calls “Air-Sea Battle.”3 Both countries are preparing for a 
long-term competition for control of the maritime approaches to East Asia. The question posed 
here is how the Western Pacific naval race is likely to unfold and what it means more broadly for the 
future of warfare. 
The discussion in American defense circles about the rise of the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN) is often cast in terms of the most recent naval race in which the United States participated: 
the Cold War competition with the Soviets.4 Andrew Krepinevich, among many others, has drawn 
an analogy between the emerging situation in the Western Pacific and the US-Soviet naval race over 
the northern maritime approaches to Western Europe (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
(NATO’s) “Northern Flank”) between 1960 and 1990.5 It is this experience, and its agreeable 
outcome for the United States, that provides the prism for current American thinking about China 
and maritime access in the Western Pacific.  
This article unpacks the Northern Flank analogy and explores its implications for maritime access 
and denial in future warfare. It first describes the terms of the debate in the United States and, in 
particular, the “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD) label that has been coined to describe the 
operational problem of maritime access in contemporary conditions. It then examines the Northern 
Flank analogy in as much detail as space limitations will allow, highlighting key aspects of the Cold 
War naval arms race that are sometimes overlooked in today’s debates. It closes by assessing the 
validity of the analogy and its potential implications for maritime access and the future of warfare. 
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 Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) in American defense planning 
Transoceanic force projection has been the sine quo non of American military power for more than a 
century. With its transition from a continental power to a global power in the aftermath of the 
Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States began to perceive interests and obligations outside 
its hemisphere. Military commitments and requirements naturally followed, entailing the twin 
problems of force projection and access to potential theaters of operation. The ensuing century of 
military expansion — from the Great White Fleet and frontier constabulary forces to global 
maritime supremacy and a permanent overseas presence on four continents — redefined the United 
States as a global military power that is uniquely secure in its own continental position and both 
interested and capable of projecting power onto the Eurasian landmass.  
Today, the implicit assumption throughout American defense planning is that all future major wars 
involving the United States will occur outside the Western Hemisphere, requiring the projection of 
military power across the Atlantic and/or Pacific oceans.6 The US armed forces are shaped and 
structured around this requirement, from US Transportation Command’s massive transoceanic 
mobility and sustainment capability to the design of tactical units in the four services, all of which, 
from brigade combat teams to fighter wings, are designed to be deployed across the ocean and 
employed on foreign territory.7 Thus, the question of access and denial is central for American 
defense planners.  
During the recent post-Cold War “interwar” period it would have been easy for anyone reading 
official DoD planning documents to believe otherwise. American air and maritime supremacy 
appeared so total that the problem of securing access for expeditionary force projection began to 
fade from view.8 This began to change at the turn of the new century when analysts from think 
tanks such as the RAND Corporation and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 
(CSBA) began to take a fresh look at US force-projection plans and capabilities.9 They found 
troubling vulnerabilities, including trends in the development of land-based, medium-range ballistic 
and cruise missiles that could soon pose a major threat to American facilities overseas and perhaps 
surface ships.10 Concern gradually mounted within American’s expert community, until Andrew 
Krepinevich crystallized the issue inside the Washington, DC, Beltway in 2003 by giving it a label 
and an acronym: Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD).11  
For reasons that remain obscure, Krepinevich separated the access-denial challenge into two 
categories in his 2003 study. “Anti-Access” was defined as “actions that inhibit movement of 
military forces into a potential or current theater of operations.”12 “Area Denial” was defined, on the 
other hand, as “actions that inhibit the movement of military forces within a theater of 
operations.”13 Thus the same actions would fall into a different conceptual category according to 
whether or not they occurred within an area that DoD defined as a “theater,” a geographic construct 
that in the past has often been granted on political or bureaucratic grounds rather than substantive 
military considerations. Though neither term is officially recognized or defined by DoD, A2/AD is 
now routinely used by those in government as well as the expert community. Few observe the 
distinction between “Anti-Access” and “Area Denial,” however, and many use the label A2/AD 
without knowing precisely what the letters represent. Moreover, the terms have in recent years 
acquired a distinctly maritime dimension that is not reflected in Krepinevich’s original wording. In 
practice, the longstanding American defense planning challenge of maritime access has been recast 
as A2/AD.14 This article will observe current convention without attempting to resolve these issues. 
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 Watching Hainan… 
Though think tanks succeeded in raising awareness of the A2/AD challenge within the expert 
community, the raging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan kept “next-war” issues, such as maritime access, 
on the back burner in DoD during the first decade of the 21st century. This changed in late 2010, 
when the Chief of Naval Operations reported that the PLAN had fielded an Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC) version of the Dong Feng (East Wind) missile, the 21D.15 China’s DF-21D is a road-
mobile, two-stage, solid-propellant, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) with an estimated 
maximum operational range of 800 nautical miles. It is believed to carry a maneuverable reentry 
vehicle (MaRV) warhead equipped with a terminal radar seeker to guide the final stages of an attack 
on a ship target. It was developed from the DF-21A MRBM, itself a development of the 1960s-era 
JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile.16  
In recent years the PLA has also deployed several constellations of satellites that could potentially 
provide reconnaissance and targeting data to the DF-21D. These are reported to include electro-
optical, synthetic aperture radar, and electronic intelligence satellites. The Yaogan 9 constellation of 
three radar satellites launched in March 2010 appear to fly in distinctive orbital formation, leading 
some to suspect they are dedicated ocean reconnaissance platforms. The Yaogan 11 constellation of 
three radar satellites launched in September 2010 and the Shi Jian-6 pair of electronic intelligence 
satellites may also have a naval role.17 
The scenario that concerns many American planners is that of a crisis in the Western Pacific 
requiring an American military response in support of a regional ally, such as Taiwan, South Korea, 
Japan, or the Philippines. Should Beijing find American military involvement unacceptable, the 
PLA’s conventional MRBMs land-attack cruise missiles have the capability to effectively prevent 
large-scale air operations from existing US airbases in the region.18 US Navy (USN) Carrier Strike 
Groups (CSGs) are therefore expected to carry most of the burden of an American response. The 
advent of the DF-21D, as a supplement to existing air, surface, and subsurface capabilities, 
substantially raises the potential risk to CSGs operating in the Western Pacific. 
The strategic implications of the Western Pacific A2/AD competition are potentially quite serious. 
If China demonstrates the ability to limit or deny access to the Western Pacific, American options 
for supporting its allies in the region — whether against China or some other threat — would 
become contingent, to some degree, on Chinese acquiescence. The value of American security 
guarantees would decline, raising fundamental questions for regional stability. The United States has 
demonstrated that it wishes to avert this situation by, among other things, shifting additional naval 
assets to the Pacific Fleet and adjusting its research and acquisition programs to account for growing 
PLAN capabilities. The United States and China are, therefore, beginning a closely coupled 
action/reaction dynamic in the development of naval capabilities in the Western Pacific. In other 
words, they are beginning a naval race. 
How will this naval race unfold over time? No one can say for certain, of course, but many in 
American defense circles point to the extended US-Soviet Cold War competition for access to the 
Norwegian Sea as an analogy for understanding the dynamics of today’s emerging naval 
competition. We turn next to examine this “Northern Flank” analogy and its potential implications. 
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 …Remembering Murmansk 
The strategic outlines of the Northern Flank naval race may be familiar to readers. The military 
fulcrum of the Cold War was Central Europe, where NATO and Warsaw Pact ground and air forces 
faced each other across the inner German border. NATO considered it possible that the Soviet 
Union might be tempted to invade Western Europe unless NATO maintained sufficient 
conventional forces to deny a quick victory to Moscow without resort to nuclear weapons. The 
conventional balance in Central Europe was, therefore, a matter of primary concern to policymakers 
and planners.19 
An essential element of the conventional balance in Europe was the ability of the United States to 
reinforce NATO with heavy ground units stationed in the continental United States. Some of these 
units would deploy by air and draw equipment from pre-positioned stocks in Europe, but the bulk 
would move by sea with their equipment and supplies. These reinforcements would be necessary to 
sustain NATO resistance over time in the face of large-scale Soviet mobilization of its reserve forces 
and to throw back the Soviets from territorial gains that they would undoubtedly make in the initial 
weeks of a war.20  
As a result, the credibility of NATO’s conventional deterrent rested in some measure on the ability 
of the United States to move reinforcements to Europe by ship. This meant that NATO was forced 
to take seriously the defense of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between the United States 
and Western Europe, particularly West Germany’s ports on the North Sea. The Soviet Union had a 
concomitant interest in denying, or at least appearing able to deny, those SLOCs to NATO in order 
to prevent these reinforcements from influencing the correlation of forces.21  
Access to those SLOCs turned on maritime access to the northern approaches to Western Europe. 
To the extent that NATO could control the Norwegian Sea it could defend the SLOCs and the 
North Sea ports required for reinforcing the continent. This was NATO’s so-called “Northern 
Flank.” If the Soviets could control the Norwegian Sea they could turn this flank and jeopardize 
NATO’s conventional reinforcements. At stake was not just wartime effectiveness but also 
peacetime NATO-alliance cohesion, the bargaining power of the two blocs, and stability during 
crises.22 
The control of the Norwegian Sea was also important to the Soviets for reasons other than access to 
NATO SLOCs. The Soviet Navy operated a key portion of its ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) 
bastion from ports near Murmansk. During the early years of the Cold War, these SSBNs transited 
the Norwegian Sea to operate off the Atlantic seaboard of the United States. As the Soviets fielded 
longer-range, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the SSBNs could operate from the Barents Sea 
itself. In both cases the Soviets needed to prevent NATO from controlling the Norwegian Sea in 
order to protect SSBNs transiting to mid-Atlantic launch areas during the early Cold War period and 
protect later SSBNs operating in the Barents Sea bastion.23 The Norwegian Sea, therefore, played an 
important role in the security and stability of Soviet second-strike capabilities. 
An unfortunate byproduct of the close proximity of NATO SLOCs and the Soviet SSBN bastion 
was that Soviet naval capabilities required to protect the bastion naturally created the ability to deny 
the SLOCs to NATO. The reverse was also true. The NATO capabilities required to secure the 
SLOCs naturally created the capability to jeopardize the Soviet SSBN bastion and, therefore, the 
invulnerability of its second-strike capability. The US intelligence community debated for decades 
whether the Soviets really intended to conduct a denial campaign against the SLOCs or were merely 
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 positioning themselves to protect their SSBN bastion.24 Ultimately NATO was obliged to act as if 
the latter were true because Soviet intentions were unknowable and subject to change.  
Figure 1, below, indicates the consensus position among US intelligence analysts regarding Soviet 
naval operating areas during a future conflict. The area shaded darkest on the map corresponds to 
the projected Soviet SSBN bastion, incorporating the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea. This area 
extends approximately 2,000 km from the main Soviet naval airfields on the Kola Peninsula. Inside 
this zone, the intelligence community expected the Soviet Navy to conduct “sea control” operations, 
effectively denying access to Western naval forces and using the area themselves for strategic strike 
operations.  
 
Figure 1: Projected Soviet Naval Operating Areas 
 
 
Source: “Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through the 1990s,” National Intelligence Estimate NIE11-15-84, 21 
December 1984. Originally classified Secret, declassified as sanitized on 29 October 1999. 
 
The part of the map shaded more lightly, extending some 3,000 km from the airfields on the Kola 
Peninsula, is the area in which the intelligence community expected the Soviet Navy to conduct 
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 “denial” operations, denying or disrupting Western naval operations sufficient to prevent those 
forces from accomplishing their missions, which the Soviets expected to be air and cruise missile 
strikes on Soviet land targets. Note that the denial area incorporates the approaches to ports in 
Western Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands that would be used to disembark US 
reinforcements.  
Very broadly speaking, the story of the US-Soviet competition for maritime access to the Norwegian 
Sea began in the mid-1950s and unfolded in three major phases.25 Prior to this, the Soviet Navy was 
primarily designed to protect the coastal areas of the Soviet Union from attacks by Western naval 
forces. Its inventory comprised mostly short-range diesel attack submarines (SSs) and surface patrol 
craft (the OSA and KOMAR classes) equipped with torpedoes and short-range SS-N-1 and SS-N-2 
anti-ship missiles.26 Soviet Naval Aviation was equipped with Tu-95 BEAR and Tu-16 BADGER 
bombers with limited anti-ship capabilities.27 The Soviet Navy of the early 1950s was, therefore, a 
coastal defense force with a limited capacity for contesting the immediate approaches to Soviet 
waters. It did not possess the capability to threaten NATO SLOCs beyond a few long-range 
submarines and potential mining operations in Western harbors.28  
During the mid-1950s, and particularly in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev decided that the Soviet Union should have a blue water navy. In 1956, he issued the 
order to expand the Soviet Navy into a force capable of carrying out four missions: protecting the 
new class of YANKEE-class SSBNs as they operated abroad, defending the homeland against US 
carrier attacks, conducting power-projection operations in the “Third World,” and operating against 
NATO SLOCs in a time of war. A subsequent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimate described 
the decision as follows: 
With Khruschev’s ascent to power in the mid-1950s, the Soviet Navy undertook to 
develop new capabilities to meet the threat posed by the carrier strike fleets. The 
course adopted was to develop anti-ship cruise-missile systems for surface ships, 
submarines, and aircraft, and to institute long-range surveillance of US aircraft carrier 
movements at sea. … By about 1960 the Soviet Navy had developed capabilities to 
counter the carrier strike fleets, defend the maritime approaches to the USSR, and 
supplement the emerging strategic strike capability of the newly-formed Soviet 
Strategic Rocket Forces.29  
Khrushchev’s decision inaugurated the first phase of US–Soviet competition for control over the 
Norwegian Sea. During the late 1950s and early 1960s the Soviets significantly modernized their 
surface, submarine, and naval aviation to implement the new strategy. In particular, the Soviet Navy 
created a reconnaissance-strike complex capable of targeting Western carrier strike groups at 
extended ranges. The key elements of this reconnaissance-strike complex were the KRESTA-class 
cruisers (CGs); KOTLIN-class, guided missile destroyers (DDGs); and ECHO-class, nuclear-
powered cruise-missile submarines (SSGNs). All of these carried the long-range (250 nautical miles) 
SS-N-3 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM).30 The SS-N-3 was a large, turbojet-powered missile carrying 
1,000 pounds of explosives and a terminal attack radar.31 Several could be carried by each of the new 
classes of ships. The SS-N-3 created a serious naval scare in the West, not unlike the DF-21D is 
doing today, because it appeared to create the capacity for the Soviet Navy to engage and destroy the 
US Navy’s key capital ships at extended ranges. By the end of the decade, US intelligence sources 
estimated that the Soviet Navy would find and sink most US carriers in the initial stages of a war.32 
The Soviets also introduced the sensor and targeting network necessary to employ the SS-N-3 
against Western naval forces. In the late 1950s, the Soviets developed an over-the-horizon electronic 
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 support measure (ESM) capability that allowed their Navy to monitor the location of NATO naval 
forces from their radars, communications, and other electronic emissions.33 The BEAR-D variant of 
the Tu-95 bomber was also introduced, carrying a large maritime radar to track and target Western 
naval forces, along with “trawlers” that tailed these forces during peacetime to provide an initial fix 
should war erupt.34  
The Soviet concept of operations was that the ESM would provide a general indication of the 
location of Western naval units, particularly carrier groups emitting unique radar and radio 
signatures. “Tattletale” trawlers would supplement this picture during peacetime. In the initial hours 
of a conflict, BEAR-D reconnaissance aircraft and submarines would fix the locations of Western 
naval forces and pass this data to ECHOs, KRESTAs, and KOTLINs, which would then launch 
coordinated waves of SS-N-3s at the predicted locations of the targets. When the ASCMs arrived in 
the vicinity of the Western naval units, they would activate their onboard terminal-attack radars and 
strike key targets, ideally the strike carriers.35  
The United States developed and implemented countermeasures against this capability during the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. The central element of this response was the improvement of fleet air 
defense capabilities against ASCM-type targets. The US Navy fielded the TRUXTON and 
BELKNAP classes of CGs designed to accompany carrier strike groups and provide air defense 
with the Standard Missile 1 (SM-1), which was capable of intercepting air targets out to 40 nautical 
miles.36 The USN also fielded the E-2A Hawkeye airborne early-warning aircraft and the Navy 
Tactical Data System to link the E-2As with F-4 Phantoms flying combat air patrols with AIM-7E 
Sparrow medium-range, air-to-air missiles against Soviet aircraft and cruise missiles.37 The USN 
improved its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities by upgrading its fixed sonar system in the 
North Atlantic, fielding the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft equipped with an advanced magnetic 
anomaly detector and sonar-equipped buoys, and fielding the STURGEON class of quiet, long-
range nuclear attack submarines (SSNs).38  
The US-Soviet competition, therefore, turned on the issue of range. In the air-surface domain, it 
became a competition between the range of maritime search radars against US air surveillance 
radars. In terms of airborne weapons, it was the range of the SS-N-3 against that of the F-4s and 
SM-1s. In the sub-surface domain, it became a competition of the SS-N-3 against the P-3 and 
STURGEON SSNs hunting the ECHO SSGNs. Both sides actively sought to out-range their 
adversary’s sensors, platforms, and weapons, thereby gaining a key advantage in naval engagements 
conducted by heavily armed but poorly protected units. 
Phase two of the competition began in the late 1960s as the Soviets reacted to US countermeasures 
against the Soviet maritime reconnaissance-strike complex. Their response was to extend the range 
of their sensors, strike platforms, and weapon systems. The most important innovation was the 
development of the Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (RORSAT) constellation that extended 
Soviet maritime sensor coverage to the entire globe.39  Though the initial generation of RORSAT 
was primitive by Western standards, it provided a useful complement to the ESM and airborne 
elements of the sensor system.40 
The Soviets also expanded their arsenal of anti-ship missiles, developing the air-launched AS-4B 
(250 nm), AS-5 (100 nm), AS-6 (250 nm) missiles to complement the SS-N-3 in the counter-carrier 
mission. The new generation of anti-ship missiles (ASMs) were much faster and more difficult to 
target than the SS-N-3. They were guided by improved radar seekers, passive receivers for anti-radar 
operations, and, in some cases, passive infrared seekers. All flew profiles that were more difficult to 
intercept with SAMs.41  
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 Finally, the Soviets increased the range and capability of missile-carrying platforms. The KARA class 
CGs, KRESTA CGs, and KRIVAK FFGs were all introduced during this period and carried the 
new SS-N-14 dual anti-submarine and anti-ship missile.42 The Tu-95 BEAR F was upgraded to carry 
the AS-3 and new ESM and reconnaissance variants were introduced, the Tu-16 BADGER was 
similarly upgraded to carry the AS-4 and act as an improved sensor platform, and the Tu-22 
BLINDER was introduced as another AS-4 carrier.43   
Together these improvements represented an enhanced threat to NATO operations in the 
Norwegian Sea. The United States responded in phase two by again increasing the range of its own 
sensors, platforms, and weapons. The 1970s saw the introduction of the VIRGINIA and 
CALIFORNIA-class CGs and SPRUANCE DDGs equipped with longer-range (90 nm) SM-2s,44 as 
well as the long-range air defense team of the E-2C Hawkeye and F-14A Tomcat equipped with the 
AWG-9 long-range, air-to-air radar and the AIM-54 long-range (100 nm) air-to-air missile.45 The 
United States also improved its anti-submarine capabilities by introducing the LOS ANGELES-class 
SSN, upgrading the fixed sonar array system in the North Atlantic, and developing an improved 
version of the P-3 Orion.46 Finally, the Navy fielded its own AGM-84 Harpoon ASM carried by 
surface ships, aircraft, and submarines capable of striking Soviet surface targets.47  
Together these improvements greatly expanded the range at which US naval forces could detect and 
engage Soviet airborne, surface, and subsurface platforms and the missiles carried by those 
platforms. The concept of operations was to “shoot the archer.” E-2Cs would detect an inbound 
Soviet air raid at extended range, which would then be engaged by F-14s before they could launch 
their ASMs against US surface ships. E-2Cs, satellites, and surface sensors would detect Soviet 
surface units before they could launch their missiles, which would then be engaged by US platforms 
carrying Harpoons. Soviet submarines would be detected by fixed sonar arrays and prosecuted by 
the long-range P-3s and SSNs before they could engage US surface ships.  
NATO also countered the growing Soviet threat against its SLOCs by expanding the geographic 
scope of the Northern Flank. The alliance began planning to operate land-based fighters and 
maritime aircraft from airfields in Norway, secured by US Marines as well as Norwegian forces, to 
attrite Soviet aircraft as they transited to the Norwegian Sea. Capabilities in Scotland were similarly 
expanded, as were US air and maritime patrol capabilities based in Iceland. These redeployments 
further adjusted their air and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) umbrella north of the SLOCs.48  
In retrospect, it is clear that the US response really began to gather momentum in phase two of the 
competition. The breadth and technical sophistication of the response are notable, as is the level of 
effort and cost involved. What is less clear is how the US and Soviet responses influenced the 
overall balance in the Norwegian Sea. Though the technical systems fielded by the United States and 
NATO were quite impressive, the mid-1970s were also a period of significant hollowness within the 
force. Training hours and steaming days declined even as the Soviet Navy continued to increase its 
equivalent operations and training activities. 49 Had the situation devolved to a test of arms during 
the 1970s it is not clear which side would have been more capable of adapting the potential of their 
technical tools to the particular operational context of the conflict. The interactions between the two 
sides were limited, as were observable exercises, making the assessment of a net balance quite 
complex. 
Phase three of the competition began in the early 1980s. The Soviets again sought to offset 
American responses through increasing the range of sensors, weapons, and platforms. The 
RORSAT constellation was substantially expanded and upgraded during this period. The Soviet 
Navy also fielded the KIROV class of heavy cruisers armed with long-range (300 nm) SS-N-19 
Strategic Insights • October 2011 Volume 10, Special Issue 85
Grissom Watching Hainan, Remembering Murmansk: Cold War Analogies, Maritime Access, and the Future of Warfare
 ASMs and long-range SA-N-6 SAMs, along with the SLAVA-class DDGs armed with 300-nm range 
SS-N-12s and the SOVREMENNY-class DDGs armed with very long range and fast SS-N-22 
ASMs.50 The surface ships were complemented by the SIERRA and AKULA-class SSNs, which 
were much quieter and armed with the 1600nm SS-N-21 sea-launched cruise missiles.51 The Soviets 
also fielded a quieter SSGN, the OSCAR, equipped with the SS-N-19.52 Essentially, the Soviet 
submarine fleet significantly reduced the range at which they could be detected while extending the 
range at which they could strike US surface units. 
In the aerial domain, the Soviets fielded the Tu-22M (sometimes referred to as the Tu-26) 
BACKFIRE-C armed with the 400-nm range AS-6 ASM.53 The Soviets also deployed the Su-27 
FLANKER long-range fighters for the first time to protect the BEARs, BLINDERs, and 
BACKFIREs against US fighters.54 Finally, the Soviet Navy also began constructing a conventional 
large-deck carrier that some believed would be tasked with contesting air superiority of the 
Norwegian Sea during a time of conflict.55  
For the United States, phase three of the competition occurred during the years of the Reagan 
buildup. The USN fielded the TICONDEROGA and ARLEIGH BURKE classes of AEGIS-
equipped surface combatants, the block 3 version of the SM-2 to operate with AEGIS, the B and C 
models of the AIM-54, the F/A-18 Hornet, and the ASM-135 anti-satellite missile for targeting 
Soviet RORSATs.56 Perhaps more importantly, however, the DoD again filled the coffers for 
training, maintenance, and steaming days. US forces became substantially more battle ready, and 
declassified intelligence sources from the period suggest that the intangible factors of experience and 
adaptability began to tilt heavily in favor of the United States.57 An example of this is the exercise 
conducted by the United States in 1986, during which a carrier strike group adopted emissions 
control measures that prevented the Soviets from detecting or tracking the strike group until it 
began simulated strike operations against Soviet bases near Murmansk.58  
 
What can be learned from the Northern Flank analogy? 
This examination of the US-Soviet naval race on NATO’s northern flank suggests five potential 
insights for the emerging naval race in the Western Pacific. First, the United States and the Soviet 
Union clearly engaged in a dynamic of coupled action/reaction innovation that substantially 
accelerated the state of the art in maritime access and anti-access operations. The development of 
anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, long-range SAMs and air-to-air missiles, ocean 
surveillance satellites, and a number of other capabilities occurred far more quickly than they would 
have if the US-Soviet competition had not existed.  
The emerging US-PRC competition in the Western Pacific fits this description as well. China has 
integrated anti-ship MRBMs with over-the-horizon radars and satellite constellations in an 
innovative manner that harkens back to the reconnaissance-strike complex built around the SS-N-3 
in the 1960s. It has developed MRBMs, particularly the DF-21C, and land-attack cruise missiles for 
striking airbases ashore in an integrated counter-access campaign. The PLAN’s KILO, YANG, 
SONG, and SHANG classes of SSNs are ASCM-capable, as are its long- and short-range strike 
aircraft. The PLA is developing the J-20 stealth fighter or strike aircraft, the role of which is not clear 
in public sources, and a conventional aircraft carrier. All of this has occurred in the same amount of 
time required for the Soviets to complete the first phase of the Cold War competition for access to 
the Norwegian Sea. The United States has responded by developing the Air-Sea Battle concept; 
shifting LOS ANGELES SSNs, SEA WOLF SSNs, TRIDENT SSGNs, and ballistic missile 
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 defense-capable (BMD) AEGIS ships to the Pacific Fleet; expanding the number of BMD-capable 
ships it will acquire; and adjusting its basing posture in the Western Pacific. The action/reaction 
dynamic of a naval race clearly already exists.59 In coming years, this dynamic will drive forward the 
state of the art in access/anti-access capabilities at a rate, and in directions, they would not have 
otherwise.  
Second, to the extent that the Western Pacific naval race follows a similar trajectory to the Northern 
Flank naval race, innovation can be expected to occur rapidly along multiple axes in multiple 
domains. “Vertical innovation” will pivot on the interaction of the range of sensors, platforms, and 
weapons. Successive generations of sensors will have greater theoretic detection ranges while 
platforms and weapons will become stealthier to reduce the de facto range of sensors. Platform and 
weapon ranges will be extended, and speeds accelerated, on both the offensive and defensive ends 
of the competition. “Horizontal” innovation will occur as the adversaries seek advantages in new 
domains: air, surface, subsurface, space, electromagnetic, geographic, and cyber. As during the Cold 
War, the interaction of these innovations will become quite complex and difficult to model and 
understand. This complexity lends uncertainty and instability to naval races, since the platforms are 
relatively small in number and lacking in survivability while, at the same time, being highly lethal to 
each other. A single comparative advantage can turn the relative naval balance of power on its head, 
but the cross-domain effects of vertical and horizontal innovation are very difficult to predict. As a 
result, the emerging naval race in the Western Pacific is likely to produce periods of apparent 
instability and resulting naval scares. Cold War alarm over the Soviet’s SS-N-3 and current worry 
over China’s DF-21D are instructive in this regard. 
Third, the innovations pursued by the competitors will not be driven solely by objective assessments 
of the technical military balance, to the limited extent these are possible in the first place. Though 
space limitations for this paper prevent a detailed discussion of the complicated factors that shaped 
Soviet and US naval innovation during the Cold War, sources make clear that the actual processes 
that produced key innovations in the US-Soviet competition were influenced by a combination of 
perceived military requirements and politics at the national and bureaucratic levels of both 
countries.60 This echoes the academic literature on military innovation and arms races, which 
emphasizes the complex relationship between the capabilities a nation “should” develop under 
objective conditions and the capabilities actually developed in practice.61 To understand how the 
emerging naval race in the Western Pacific will unfold, it will be necessary to understand the political 
and bureaucratic systems on both sides.62  
Furthermore, the actual balance of military capabilities “in the field” is highly dependent on 
innovation and adaptability within operational units. The technical systems fielded by the 
competitors are merely potential until they are translated into action by operational units. The ability 
of those units to adapt their technical systems to the needs of the moment, and innovate, is the 
primary determinant of the true balance of capabilities, yet this is extraordinarily difficult to analyze 
and predict.63 As Robert Angevine has described in his path-breaking work on naval innovation 
during the Cold War, the USN was able to substantially reduce the effectiveness of Soviet ASCMs 
during the 1960s by experimenting with dispersed formations and emissions-control procedures. 
Senior US officers of the period concluded that these new tactics would alter the naval balance in 
the initial days of a future conflict. However, the impact of these bottom-up innovations was not 
evident to those assessing the naval balance from inside the Beltway. Adaptation and bottom-up 
innovation of this sort distorts the actual balance from the purely technological balance, adding 
further uncertainty and instability to naval races.64  
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 Fourth, the innovations that occur in the context of a naval race are not limited to that area or those 
competitors. The US-Soviet naval race accelerated innovations that quickly leaked to other powers 
and other regions of the world. For example, the Soviet Navy supplied the SS-N-2 to more than 25 
countries and sold the SS-N-3 to Angola, North Korea, and Syria.65 Indeed much of China’s own 
advanced naval weaponry, from KILO-class submarines to the Shilang, was originally developed by 
the Soviets during the Cold War.  
The combination of rapidly advancing state-of-the-art military technologies and proliferation of 
these developments can have serious consequences for states that are not involved in the 
competition itself. For example, in 1967 the Egyptian Navy sank the Israeli DDG Eilat with SS-N-
2s provided by the Soviet Union. Indian Navy ships did the same to a Pakistani DDG and 
merchantmen in 1971. The 2006 Lebanon War featured a Chinese C-802 ASM employed by 
Hezbollah, a non-state actor. This suggests that the fruits of the Western Pacific naval race are likely 
to proliferate to other actors in the international system. For the United States, the implications of 
this proliferation should be manageable, because the USN will be involved in the cutting edge of 
these developments. For allies and others who are not involved in the competition, however, the 
ramifications may be more serious as the state of the art accelerates and proliferates. 
The Falklands War of 1992 provides an example from recent history. Both the British and 
Argentines possessed small numbers of advanced naval systems but neither was directly involved in 
the Cold War naval race. Despite the rudimentary nature of the Argentine anti-surface threat, the 
Royal Navy suffered 15 ships damaged and six major ships sunk (SHEFFIELD, ARDENT, 
ANTELOPE, COVENTRY, ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, and GALAHAD). Had the USN been 
conducting the operation instead of the British Royal Navy, with CSGs supported by AEGIS ships 
instead of “through-deck” carriers and ASW-oriented surface ships, there is little question that the 
Argentines would have enjoyed little if any success. Strictly speaking, the United States was no more 
capable than the Royal Navy, but it had been preparing to repel serious air and missile attacks for 
decades and invested in the necessary capabilities. The Royal Navy had not and paid a tremendous 
price for falling behind. 
Another analogy might be drawn from the development of suppression of enemy air defense 
(SEAD) capabilities over the past four decades. During the 1960s there was an intense competition 
between the United States and the Soviet Union in the air defense domain. In Southeast Asia, the 
United States lost hundreds of aircraft to Soviet-supplied (and sometimes Soviet-operated) air 
defenses over North and South Vietnam. The integrated air defense system (IADS) protecting 
North Vietnam was particularly vexing for the United States. As a result, the United States devoted 
enormous resources and energy in ensuing decades to overcome such IADSs. By doing so, it rapidly 
advanced the state of the art in SEAD, fielding stealth aircraft, land-attack cruise missiles, stand-off 
precision weapons, advanced anti-radar weapons, jamming and spoofing techniques, and tactics for 
quickly “taking down” an IADS. While some Western allies also invested in SEAD capability, all 
began to lag substantially behind US capabilities. By 1990, the United States was essentially required 
to participate in any Western air operation confronted by ground-based air defenses, because it alone 
had developed the capability to neutralize air-defense systems at little risk. The operation currently 
underway in Libya is a notable example of otherwise advanced Western forces requiring the United 
States to “kick the door down” against quite modest and dated air defenses. It is conceivable that a 
similar dynamic might evolve in the maritime access realm, in which the United States ends up far 
ahead of its allies because it is and will be for the foreseeable future competing directly with China. 
As anti-access capabilities proliferate, Western navies may find themselves more dependent on the 
United States than they are today.  
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 This dynamic may be most problematic for European navies, which are accustomed to possessing a 
technical edge over non-Western navies, yet are unlikely to become involved in the Western Pacific. 
If China continues to proliferate advanced systems to developing states, European navies may find 
that they are outclassed in some respects by the anti-access capabilities possessed by some of these 
recipients. Given the pointed nature of European refusals to consider supporting the United States 
in a future confrontation with China, the United States may feel little inclination to share its 
advanced countermeasures with Europeans or support European operations when confronted by 
proliferated advanced anti-access systems. One indirect result of the Western Pacific naval race may 
be the obsolescence of European naval power. 
Finally, during the cold war the Northern Flank naval race was simply one aspect in a grand strategic 
competition that already dominated the relationship between the two superpowers. Earlier examples 
of naval races, such as the Anglo-German naval race at the turn of the twentieth century, suggest 
that these races can influence the broader political relationship between the competitors, particularly 
when naval scares become political and social issues.66 The concern remains that a narrow military-
technical competition in the Western Pacific may drive the broader political dynamics of the 
international system, rather than the other way around. 	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